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Abstract Time pressure is a central aspect of economic decision making nowadays.
It is therefore natural to ask how time pressure affects decisions, and how to detect
individual heterogeneity in the ability to successfully cope with time pressure. In the
context of risky decisions, we ask whether a person’s performance under time
pressure can be predicted by measurable behavior and traits, and whether such
measurement itself may be affected by selection issues. We find that the ability to
cope with time pressure varies significantly across decision makers, leading to
selected subgroups that differ in terms of their observed behaviors and personal
traits. Moreover, measures of cognitive ability and intellectual efficiency jointly
predict individuals’ decision quality and ability to keep their decision strategy under
time pressure.
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1 Introduction
Many, if not most, decisions in the workplace are made under time pressure today
(Reid and Ramarajan 2016; Wheatley 2000). Consequently, research in decision
making has recently started to investigate how a time constraint influences
individuals’ preferences and choices (for an overview, Spiliopoulos and Ortmann
2017). By randomly allocating subjects into time pressure conditions, the literature
has successfully identified its causal effects in a variety of domains, including risky,
social, and strategic behavior (e.g., Sutter et al. 2003, on bargaining; Kocher and
Sutter 2006, on beauty contests; Baillon et al. 2013, on decisions under ambiguity;
Kirchler et al. 2017, on risky decisions; Buckert et al. 2017, on imitation in strategic
games; Haji et al. 2016, on bidding in auctions).
However, these causal effects should be interpreted with caution, because of two
potentially serious problems, both relating to issues of self-selection. First, because
people differ in their ability to cope with time pressure (e.g., Claessens et al. 2017;
Eisenhardt 1989; Maruping et al. 2015, and references therein), we expect people
self-select into decision environments with a different degree of time pressure. That
is, outside the experimental laboratory, candidates self-select into activities and
occupations and thus into job-related decision-making environments. In contrast,
participants in experiments are exogenously assigned to treatment conditions that
may not fit well with their tastes and skills (Omar and List 2015). External validity
of the observed experimental behavior thus cannot be taken for granted. Despite
similarity of the experimental and the natural decision environments (in term of
time pressure), the decision makers may systematically differ across the two settings
in a self-selected way. Importantly, while external validity is an issue in any
empirical study, it is a more central aspect in laboratory experiments that explicitly
aim to mimic natural decision environments.1 Understanding the personality traits
associated with the ability to perform under time pressure in the lab would allow an
assessment of such selection in the field, and thus of the external validity of (lab-
measured) average causal effects based on the distribution of traits in actual
decision environments. Identifying such traits is one aim of the current paper.
Second, if time pressure is substantial and relevant in an experiment, some
people will violate the time constraint. This leads to problems of the internal, rather
than the external validity of the time pressure effects, because the sample of
decisions observed in the data set is self-selected.2 Failure to take these selection
effects into account may therefore result in a false interpretation of the observed
behavior in terms of population averages. For example, Tingho¨g et al. (2013) argue
that failures to replicate time pressure effects on cooperation in ethical dilemmas
(Rand et al. 2012) may be due to the original studies excluding about half of the
participants because of a failure to meet the time constraint (Casari et al. (2007)
make a similar observation in the context of auction bidding; Ambuehl et al. (2018)
1 External validity may be less of a problem in other contexts, for example time-limited offers to
consumers (Sugden et al. 2015), where self-selection is less likely.
2 A similar problem exists in studies on the effect of stress on decision making, where analyses of data
are typically restricted to those participants who show a cortisol reaction under stress (Trautmann 2014).
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show how high incentives disproportionally lure cognitively disadvantaged agents
to self-select into transactions of unclear consequences).
The current study aims to shed light on such heterogeneity and the resulting
selection effects in the presence of exogenously imposed time pressure. To this end,
we separately analyze subsamples of subjects who fail, respectively succeed, to
react in time, in terms of their behavior and traits. We demonstrate that overlooking
the selection issue in this context would result in a very different assessment of the
performance under time pressure. We focus on the domain of risky decisions. In
‘‘Risky behavior under time pressure: summary of results’’ in ‘‘Appendix’’, we
review the findings of the experimental literature in this domain. We indicate for
each study whether there is a potential threat to internal validity because of
substantial violations of the time constraints, or whether there is low time pressure,
questioning relevance. Table 8 in ‘‘Appendix’’ suggests that selection problems
should be taken seriously in the interpretation of causal time pressure effects on risk
taking.
Observing that selection issues are at the heart of experiments with time pressure
and other adverse conditions, we are the first to (1) directly measure the empirical
relevance of selection effects and (2) test whether there are individual-level
correlates based on observable background variables that can be used as predictors
for the ability of a decision maker to cope with time pressure, and thus the
propensity to self-select into time-pressure environments. The fact that decision
makers differ in their ability to deal with time pressure requires us to predict this
ability if we aim to ensure that decision makers are allocated to environments in an
efficient way.3 We use the term time pressure resistance for such ability. It relates to
differences in the decision process, including the decision maker’s time manage-
ment. Our study aims to provide insights into these processes, and how they differ
between decision makers. To this end, we collect data on risky decisions under time
pressure, augmenting a design used in Kocher et al. (2013) to allow for both
between-subject and within-subject analyses of behavior across time-constrained
conditions. That is, we observe each decision maker’s risky choice behavior both in
the presence and in the absence of time pressure for a similar set of risky
alternatives. We choose to study risky decisions under time pressure because of the
ubiquity of uncertainty in financial and managerial decision making. This, however,
does not render other domains of deciding under time pressure such as decisions in
social contexts less relevant (e.g., Cappelen et al. 2016; Rand et al. 2012).
To test whether individual differences predict decision quality under time
pressure, we assess participants’ scores on a measure of cognitive ability, on a
measure of intellectual efficiency, and a set of personality traits. Importantly, while
performance under time pressure can be measured in many ways, a risky decision
task requires complex reasoning and has no obvious solution from the perspective of
the decision maker (because optimal choices depend on preferences). Consequently,
the decision maker has to choose a decision strategy, and this strategy may be
affected by time pressure (Ordo´n˜ez and Benson 1997). Our performance measures
3 E.g. HR managers of investments firms should be able to predict the ability to resist time pressure of
prospective traders when making hiring decisions.
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aim to detect such shifts in strategy. The details of the experimental design,
including our measures of cognitive ability and intellectual efficiency are described
in the next section.
Employing this design to study person-environment interactions in the context of
time pressure, we observe the following results. First, we observe clear differences
in decision styles across people in the absence of time pressure, which are then
associated with the success in mastering the time constraint when it is present. That
is, selection is highly relevant for internal validity. Second, in attempting to then
predict the ability to perform under time pressure, we find that those who score high
in cognitive measures and have high self-efficacy perform better and are less likely
to miss the deadline, although cognitive measures only possess predictive power
jointly. Moreover, individuals’ decision style (defined below) in the absence of time
pressure correlates with performance under time pressure. Yet, we note that there is
still an important role of unobserved factors. We discuss the implications of our
findings for the external validity of time pressure effects in decision making in the
wild.
2 Studying self-selection in an adverse time-pressure environment:
experimental design
We implement an experimental structure that allows us to observe both between-
and within-subject differences in risky decision-making behavior in a time-
constrained versus an unconstrained environment. This is how we can causally
identify the effects of time pressure on risky decision making at the individual level.
As decision makers are likely to show different reactions to adverse decision
environments, we measure potentially selection-relevant individual characteristics
that may explain these differences. We can, for instance, examine how time pressure
affects different groups of people, say people who can vis-a`-vis those who cannot
cope with time pressure, and provide insights into their behaviors absent time
pressure. Within time pressure or no time pressure conditions we can also correlate
personal traits with our performance measures to understand why some people can
cope with time pressure better than others.
More specifically, for each participant we observe (a) risky choices in the
absence of time pressure; (b) risky choices in the presence of time pressure; (c) a
measure of cognitive ability (‘‘IQ’’); and (d) a measure of intellectual efficiency
(‘‘IE’’). We discuss the different tasks and measures in detail below. The general
structure of the experiment carefully counterbalances the order of the different parts
as shown in Table 1. The setup allows us to test the hypotheses (1) that those who
violate the time constraint under time pressure make substantially different choices
in the absence of time pressure; and (2) that behavior under the adverse influence of
time pressure is predicted by decision makers’ behavior in the absence of time
pressure and their observable traits.
Each set of risky choices (Set 1 and Set 2) consisted of 24 binary choices (see
Table 9 in ‘‘Appendix’’ for a full description). Time pressure was imposed by
setting time limits for each of two 12-item subsets of choices within each of these
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two sets of risky choices. In particular, each set consisted of (a) one subset of 12
binary choices that compared pure loss lotteries with mixed lotteries of lower
expected value (‘‘prominent gain’’); and (b) one subset of 12 binary choices that
compared pure gain lotteries with mixed lotteries of higher expected value
(‘‘prominent loss’’). A detailed description and motivation of these choice tasks is
given in Sect. 2.3.4 An important feature of the time pressure implementation is that
the time limit was imposed on the subset level, not on each choice item.5 That is,
participants could go through the items in each subset at their own pace and
therefore had to organize the allocation of time to the different choices efficiently.
However, subjects were not allowed to go back and reconsider earlier choices. In
contrast to situations where time pressure is imposed on individual items, varying
time pressure at the subset level adds an additional layer of complexity: Decision
makers have to simultaneously allocate their time budget to the respective items,
while considering the decision problem in the face of time pressure. This allows us
to identify time management abilities and strategies to cope with time pressure of
those who violate the time limit, and those who do not.
To make time pressure and no time pressure conditions as similar as possible in
the presentation of the instructions and the task design, the unconstrained task also
involved a time limit. However, this limit was selected such that it would not
provide a binding constraint for subjects, namely at 420 s in all subsets. The extent
of the time constraint in the time pressure conditions was calibrated in pre-test
sessions such that there would be significant time pressure, while not making it
impossible for the subjects to perform the decision task. In particular, under time
pressure, the time limits were set at 120 s for the set with the prominent gains and at
80 s for the set with the prominent losses. In both cases, this value implied a 20%
Table 1 Treatment design
Treatment
(#obs)
Part 1: indiv.
differences
Part 2: risky choices
set 1
Part 3: risky choices
set 2a
Part 4: indiv.
differences
1 (93) IQ Time pressure No time pressure IE
2 (94) IQ No time pressure Time pressure IE
3 (96) IE Time pressure No time pressure IQ
4 (96) IE No time pressure Time pressure IQ
IQ, measurement of cognitive ability; IE, measurement of intellectual efficiency; a, a set of pure gain
choices was added after Set 2 to give subjects the possibility to earn back potential losses in sets 1 and 2
(see Sect. 2.3). Note that the IQ and IE tasks allowed subjects to move back and forth across items while
this was not possible in the risky choice tasks
4 Because losses were possible in the lottery choices, we included another set of lottery choices after the
main task (Set 2/Part 3) that gave subjects the possibility to earn back any losses from sets 1 or 2. See
Sect. 2.3 for details.
5 Both forms of time pressure are commonly observed in real-life and therefore important to study.
Gabaix et al. (2006) offer a good analogy of these two forms of time pressure in a context of a shopper at
Walmart: time pressure imposed on individual items is analogue to buying a TV while considering its
many attributes; time pressure imposed on set levels is similar to a situation where the shopper wants to
buy other products (each with different attributes) within her time budget.
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reduction of the median decision times in the absence of constraints that we
observed in six pilot sessions (details about the pre-test sessions are given in the
Web Appendix6).
2.1 Cognitive ability and intellectual efficiency
We employed Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (APM) test to measure
cognitive ability (‘‘IQ’’) and intellectual efficiency (‘‘IE’’). Cognitive ability assesses
a subject’s cognitive reasoning power, i.e. the extent to which complex information
can be processed. Intellectual efficiency measures cognitive reasoning speed, i.e.
how fast incoming information can be processed (Raven et al. 1998). We
hypothesized that IQ positively predicts decision quality, whereas lower IE predicts
increases in the likelihood to violate the time constraint.
Cognitive ability constitutes a non-verbal estimate of fluid intelligence, the
ability to reason and solve novel problems. Individuals with high fluid ability are
thought to be able to better cope with time pressure, because they typically possess
larger working memory (Shelton et al. 2010). In addition, De Paola and Gioia
(2016) report that cognitive ability has a positive impact on performance under time
pressure. Intellectual efficiency in turn imposes exogenous time pressure on the
problem, such that we expect cognitive ability to be positively related to decision
quality (defined in Sect. 3), but intellectual efficiency to be predictive for the ability
to complete all necessary decisions when time is scarce.
Raven’s advanced progressive matrices are aimed at subjects in the high
cognitive ability ranges such as university students. In each item, subjects were
presented with a 3-by-3 matrix of abstract symbols, with the symbol in the lower
right corner missing. They were asked to choose, among eight possible alternatives,
the one that completed the pattern in the matrix. We communicated to subjects that
the items in the task were arranged in ascending order of difficulty and that they
could go back and forth within the (possibly non-binding) time limit to revise their
answers. An example can be seen in Fig. 1, where the correct answer is option 3.
Instead of running the full 48-item test, a short-form7 containing 12 selected
items from the APM test was administered to obtain a measure of IQ, as it has been
argued that conducting the full APM does not add much predictive power (the
correlation between the two formats is q = 0.88, see Bors and Stokes 1998). As we
are interested in the cognitive capacities of subjects, we allowed subjects to answer
all twelve items at their own pace. To keep instructions as close as possible to our
measure of intellectual efficiency (details below), we implemented a non-binding
time constraint of 25 min, which was again calibrated in pre-tests.
6 The web appendix, data, and replication files will be made available at https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.
de/dataverse/awiexeco.
7 The short form of the APM test we used here was introduced by Bors and Stokes (1998), consisting of
items 3, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 28, 30, 31, and 34 of the APM (Set II). It is more difficult, and therefore
suits university students better, than the other short version proposed earlier by Arthur and Day (1994).
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We used the remaining 34 items8 from the APM to construct a measure of
intellectual efficiency, i.e. the speed of cognitive reasoning, following Raven et al.
(1998, Section 4, APM15ff.) and Yates (1966). By imposing a severe time limit on
subjects (13 min to solve all 34 items), we measure how fast and how efficiently
they can process information. They could again reconsider earlier choices at any
time. The timing constraint proved to be binding in pre-tests: no participant was able
to finish all questions within the time limit.
Based on the tasks, we define our measures IQ and IE as the number of correct
items in the cognitive ability and the intellectual efficiency tasks, respectively.
There was no additional reduction of the score for wrong answers or missing items.
Note that, as shown in Table 1, the IQ and IE tasks were counterbalanced separately
for each ordering of the time pressure tasks. The IQ and IE tasks were incentivized
such that (1) a higher score yielded a higher chance to win a monetary prize, and (2)
subjects could never identify their number of correct answers exactly. We provide
more details on the rationale and the procedure in ‘‘Incentivization of cognitive
ability tasks’’ in ‘‘Appendix’’.
2.2 Personality measures
At the end of the experiment, we elicited several personality measures that have
often been linked to decision making (e.g., Nadkarni and Herrmann 2010), and are
potentially relevant to the ability of coping with time pressure. The generalized self-
efficacy scale (Schwarzer and Jerusalem 1995) is a ten-item questionnaire which
aims at measuring the ‘‘belief in one’s competence to tackle novel tasks and to cope
Fig. 1 A sample screen from Raven’s APM
8 We used the first two items in Set I of the APM test as instructional items, leaving 34 items for our
intellectual efficiency measure. The items’ increasing difficulty was taken into account by preserving the
items’ ordering.
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with adversity in a broad range of stressful or challenging encounters’’ (Luszczyn-
ska et al. 2005, p. 80). Time pressure is thus a natural environment in which self-
efficacy may have an effect on decision-making quality. In particular, in line with
previous research showing a positive correlation between measures of self-efficacy
and good financial planning behavior (Kuhnen and Melzer 2014), we hypothesized
that higher level of self-efficacy may be associated with better decision quality
under time pressure. Rotter’s (1966) Locus of Control questionnaire is a 28-item
survey that assesses the extent to which individuals believe that they have control
over events that affect them in their lives. Whenever individuals feel to be in
control, they might be less likely to perceive stress (e.g. generated by time pressure)
as a threat (Chan 1977). It has been shown that internally-oriented individuals are
more likely to appraise stressful situations as a controllable challenge and focus on
coping with stress, while externally-oriented individuals are more likely to be
threatened by stressors (Bernardi 1997; Folkman 1984; Parkes 1984). We therefore
hypothesized that stronger internal orientation mitigates the effects of time pressure
on decision making. A Big Five Ten Item questionnaire, measuring the Big Five
personality characteristics with ten questions was also administered (see Gosling
et al. (2003) for a comparison between this inventory and a widely used 44-item
inventory). Here we predicted that traits such as neuroticism could become a burden
under time pressure, as previous research has shown that this trait is positively
associated with task avoidance (Matthews and Campbell 1998), and Byrne et al.
(2015) have found that neuroticism is negatively correlated with performance in
tasks with social and time pressure. Finally, we elicited general demographics and
background data.
2.3 Risk preference measures
Our main task involved binary risky choices. We build on the design in Kocher et al.
(2013), who analyzed risky decisions under time pressure. That study found strong
time pressure effects for lottery choices involving mixed gambles, i.e., including
both gains and losses. In particular, under time pressure, decision makers seem to be
prone to prefer mixed gambles over pure loss gambles with higher expected value
(thus being drawn by the prominent gain in the mixed gambles); similarly, decision
makers seem to prefer pure gain gambles over mixed gambles with a higher
expected value (thus being repelled by the prominent loss in the mixed gamble).
Both Saqib and Chan (2015) and Conte et al. (2016) find similar prominence effects
under time pressure. Because we want to study the role of selection effects under
time pressure, we deliberately employed this particular structure of lottery choices,
expecting to induce robust time pressure effects with the design. As described
before, we presented subjects with two sets of choices, one set being time-
constrained, and the other de facto unconstrained. Each set consisted of a subset of
12 choices of the prominent-gain format, and 12 choices of the prominent-loss
format. The order of the two subsets was fixed, each subject first worked on the
subset in the prominent-gain format, before moving on to the prominent-loss format.
The two subsets were separately time-constrained as described above. Within each
subset, subjects had to proceed through the choice problems in a given order (fixed
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over all subjects and conditions) and could not go back to revise previous choices. A
list of all choices is given in ‘‘List of binary risky choices’’ in ‘‘Appendix’’. A
screenshot of the presentation of the choices is given in ‘‘Graphical presentation of
risky choices’’ in ‘‘Appendix’’.
Subjects made as many choices as possible within the time constraint. At the end
of the experiment, one choice was selected randomly from all the potential choice
problems in Set 1 and Set 2, and payoffs depended on the decision made, i.e. the
lottery chosen, in this choice problem (this procedure prevented wealth or house
money effects, which we considered relevant in the context of risky choice). If a
subject violated the time constraint and thus failed to answer some of the questions,
she would receive the lowest possible outcome (i.e., the highest possible loss) if one
of the unanswered decision problems was selected for payment. This severe form of
punishment encouraged subjects to always make a decision, and it is a common
feature of many real-life decision environments with time pressure (e.g. air traffic
control, emergency room doctors).9 For example, if the selected choice problem
involved a choice between the lottery (15%: - €15, 85%: - €11) and (15%: €12,
85%: - €17) (see S1/G11 in Table 9 in ‘‘Appendix’’), the earnings for a person who
did not submit a decision was - €17.
Because the risky choices of sets 1 and 2 involved potential losses, we needed to
endow the participants with sufficient funds to cover any losses they might incur in
parts 2 and 3 of the experiment. Therefore, an additional task was added after Set 2
that involved six risky choices between lotteries in which the lowest possible gain
amounted to €20. By adding the endowment task after all Part 2 and Part 3 choices
had been made, and by endowing with the help of risky choices, we prevented
subjects from integrating the endowment easily with the loss outcomes in the
choices in earlier parts. This method was adapted from Kocher et al. (2013). We did
not impose a time limit on the endowment task. At the end of the experiment, one of
the six choices was randomly selected for payment, and earnings were added to
earnings from the lottery selected from sets 1 and 2. When working on Set 1 and Set
2, subjects were not aware how the subsequent task would look like; they only knew
that other parts were to follow and that they would not incur overall net losses from
the experiment. In the analyses below, we always report performance based on
behavior in sets 1 and 2, thus not incorporating the endowment task.
2.4 Laboratory details
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and recruitment
was done with the help of ORSEE (Greiner 2015). We conducted 16 experimental
sessions at the MELESSA laboratory at the University of Munich in July and
September 2014. In total, 379 subjects took part in the experiment, up to 24 in each
9 We intended to study an environment in which failing to meet the time constraint has clear and severe
consequences. In particular, we wanted to implement a trade-off between making more thoughtful
decisions and answering all decision problems. We did not want to add risky decision considerations to
this trade-off by, for example, paying some metric like the expected value or selecting one option
randomly. We observe that in most real world settings agents do not receive a randomly selected option,
or an average payment, if they fail to choose in time.
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session. 60% of the subjects were female with an average age of 24 years. They
were mostly undergraduate and graduate students from the diverse set of programs
that the university offers.10 Payoffs were determined by randomly selecting one of
the four parts for payment, with payment details then depending on the procedures
described in the previous subsections. A typical session lasted for about 75 min, and
subjects earned on average about €16.63 (approximately $21.32 at that time). In
addition, we ran several pilot studies in Tilburg and Munich to calibrate the
appropriate timing constraints. Information on the pilots, as well as the experimental
instructions, can be found in the Web Appendix.
3 Time pressure and risky decisions: manipulation check
We first consider whether the time pressure manipulation for the risky decisions was
effective in terms of time-use, in terms of the number of participants violating the
time constraint, and in terms of the number of unanswered decision items. Table 2
shows the results using the within-subject comparison.
Clearly, subjects made substantially faster decisions under time pressure, were
more likely to violate the time constraint, and had more missing items. The
manipulation of time pressure was successful in providing a highly adverse decision
environment.
We next consider the effect of time pressure on risky decisions. The last four
columns in Table 2 show, for time-unconstrained and for time-constrained choices,
the average expected payoff that is implied by the choices the subject actually made,
the average expected payoff that is implied by all choice problems including
Table 2 Time pressure manipulation for risky decisions
Treatment Actual
time used
(average,
in s)
No. of
subjects
violating
the time
constraint
No. of
missing
items
per
person
Expected
value
(choices
made;
€)a,b
Expected
value (all
decision
problems;
€)a,c
Percent of
choices
avoiding
prominent
loss (%)
Percent of
choices
seeking
prominent
gain (%)
No time
pressure
246*** 3*** 0.01*** - 1.17** - 1.18** 53.56** 57.41
Time
pressure
158 90 0.69 - 1.24 - 1.47 54.80 57.78
Decision times reported show the sum of time used for the two subsets, S1 and S2. Total time constraint
was 200 s under time pressure, and 840 s in the absence of time pressure
aAverages reported
bNumbers reflect the expected value implied by choices actually made
cNumbers reflect the expected value implied by all choice problems, including missing items
*, **, ***Significance of difference from time pressure condition at the 10, 5, and 1% level, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test
10 15% majored in economics, 16% in business administration, while 10% were enrolled in other social
sciences programs. Furthermore, 4% were psychologists, 10% majored in the humanities, 5% in law, 21%
in the natural sciences or technology and the remaining rest 19% came from other fields.
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missing items (which count as the highest loss),11 the percentage of choices that
avoid a prominent loss, and the percentage of choices that seek a prominent gain.
The latter two percentages are conditional on the items that a person has answered.
We observe that overall, time pressure significantly reduces decision quality.12
The expected value (EV) implied by choices actually made is lower under time
pressure. Additionally, missing items lead to losses and further reduce payoffs under
time pressure. Under time pressure, participants make more choices that avoid a
prominent loss (54.80%) than in the absence of time pressure (53.56%), at a loss of
expected value (p\ 0.05). That is, choices are more heuristic under time pressure,
being affected by salient attractive aspects of the lottery and sacrificing expected
payoff. We observe that, despite the fact that the time constraint is imposed on the
set level rather than the individual task level as in Kocher et al. (2013), our findings
replicate the effects reported in their study.
Participants realize a lower expected value under time pressure. In the subsequent
analyses, we consider expected value as a measure of decision quality. This
interpretation is supported by the direct (inverse) link of expected value to heuristic
choices (loss avoiding and gain seeking). Expected payoff is also a criterion that is
applied in many professional settings outside the laboratory to assess decision
success. However, participants may not necessarily aim to maximize expected value
in the experiment. In the Web Appendix, we therefore present the main results also
under the alternative assumption that participants’ decisions may reflect cumulative
prospect theory preferences. In Sect. 5.2, we report results taking the stability of the
decision process (based on a fitted decision model) across settings as an alternative
quality criterion.
4 Results: identifying selection
We first approach the question whether selection is relevant under time pressure. To
this end, we compare those decision makers who violate the time constraint under
time pressure (N = 90) to those who do not (N = 289). A violator is defined as a
decision maker who ran out of time before making all 12 choices, in at least one of
the two subsets of risky decisions in her time-constrained part.13 Clearly, these two
groups will thus differ under time pressure. However, the within-person design also
allows us to study whether these groups differ when they are not time-constrained.14
11 As a benchmark for the subsequent analyses we observe that the highest realizable expected value was
€ -0.39, and the lowest was € -2.28, if all choices were actually answered. Not answering any item
would yield an expected payoff of € -11.23.
12 Results are even more pronounced if we only consider data in Set 1 using between-subjects
comparison. Set 2 behavior might be influenced by experience. We discuss possible learning effects in the
Web Appendix, section B.5.
13 We do not wish to invoke normative statements with respect to violating rules by choosing the term
violator.
14 In Sects. 4 and 5, we report the average treatment effects of time pressure, pooling all decisions in Set
1 and Set 2 irrespective of order. Web Appendix B.5 provides additional analyses, reporting results based
on either Set 1 or Set 2 data. Results do not differ qualitatively across the two sets. In Web Appendix B.4,
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Table 3 shows results of the comparison between the two groups for various
measures. The left panel shows behavior in the absence of time pressure. Subjects
who violate the time constraint differ substantially from those who do not violate
the constraint in the way they approach the risky decision task. In terms of decision
processes, violators use more time and distribute their time less evenly across
choices. Moreover, violators are less affected by salient loss or gain features of the
lotteries. They consequently perform significantly better on average in terms of the
implied expected value of their choices than non-violators, when not exposed to
time pressure. In the right panel of Table 3, we compare the two groups in the
presence of time pressure. Also, under a time constraint, violators use more time and
have a higher variance of time used across choice problems. They perform
significantly worse on the full set of choices. This effect is driven by the relatively
strong punishment for not answering a choice problem, which they seem not to take
sufficiently into consideration in their strategy. Moreover, under time pressure,
violators do not perform better than non-violators on the choices they actually made.
However, violators do not perform significantly worse than non-violators on these
items either.
Table 3 also shows the expected value over the set of choices for which no
subject violated the time constraint (row five).15 This includes the first seven choices
in the prominent gain sets and the first three choices in the prominent loss sets.
Table 3 Differences between time-constraint violators and non-violators
Performance measure No time pressure Time pressure
Violators
(N = 90)
Non-violators
(N = 289)
Violators
(N = 90)
Non-violators
(N = 289)
Actual time used (in sec.) 323.79 221.13*** 188.87 148.72***
Variance of time used per item 77.75 37.29*** 30.82 10.30***
Expected value (choices made; €) - 1.06 - 1.21*** - 1.29 - 1.22
Expected value (all decision problems; €) - 1.08 - 1.21*** - 2.29 - 1.22***
Expected value (items w/o violations; €)a - 3.69 - 3.90*** - 3.68 - 3.90***
Percent of choices avoiding prominent loss (%) 49.63 54.79%* 52.72 55.45
Percent of choices seeking prominent gain (%) 46.96 60.67*** 47.95 60.84***
Violator status for each subject is assigned if at least one item in at least one time-constrained subset was
not answered
aExpected value calculated on the basis of those items in the prominent gain and prominent loss subsets
that all subjects were able to answer under time pressure
*, **, ***at the entries for non-violators indicate that these values differ from those for violators, at the
10, 5, and 1% significance level, two-sided Mann–Whitney tests
Footnote 14 continued
we also report on a continuous measure number of items missed rather than the violator indicator. Results
replicate results presented in the main text.
15 For this row, we removed one subject, a violator, from the analysis in this table, as she is the only
participant violating the time constraint already at the fourth item for the subset of prominent gain
lotteries, while others violate only after the seventh item. The results remain the same if we include all
subjects but we lose a substantial amount of information for the subset of prominent gain lotteries.
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Apparently, on this subset of early choices, the violators perform much better than
the non-violators do, and this holds true in both the time pressure and the no-time
pressure condition. Moreover, comparing this performance measure across time
pressure conditions, we observe that the expected payoffs do not differ for either
group of decision makers (for both groups, p[ 0.7, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Thus, under time pressure, initially the violators can fully implement the same
decision strategy as in the absence of time pressure. However, in later decision items
when less time is available, they lose out, harming their overall performance for the
choices they actually make (shown in row three in Table 3) and even more so for
the full set of choices (shown in row four in Table 3).
This dynamic pattern of performance is shown in more detail in Table 4. The
table shows for each item, in the order of appearance, the implied expected value of
the choices made by violators and non-violators under time pressure. In the set of
prominent gains (items 1–12), violators perform better early on. In the set of
prominent losses (item 13–24), the effect is less pronounced, but points in the same
direction. As they move on with the task, violators do not make better decisions than
the non-violators anymore, possibly because time becomes scarce. This is especially
true in the set with prominent gains. Additionally, violators at some point violate the
time constraint (shown by the decrease in sample sizes indicated for each choice
item), leading to significant losses in expected value over all decision problems. We
also observe that violation of the time constraint for prominent-loss choices leads to
Table 4 Differences between time-constraint violators and non-violators across choice items under time
pressure (expected value of choices made)
Choice
problem
(prominent
gain)
Violators Non-violators Choice
problem
(prominent
loss)
Violators Non-violators
1 - 9.89 (N = 90) - 10.08 (N = 289) 13 8.56 (N = 90) 8.55 (N = 289)
2 - 5.09 (N = 90) - 5.14 14 8.93 (N = 90) 8.59*
3 - 12.37 (N = 90) - 12.56* 15 4.61 (N = 90) 4.49
4 - 5.57 (N = 89) - 5.75** 16 8.33 (N = 89) 8.30
5 - 14.17 (N = 89) - 14.56*** 17 6.12 (N = 89) 6.15
6 - 8.94 (N = 89) - 9.11** 18 9.42 (N = 88) 9.39
7 - 3.22 (N = 89) - 3.44*** 19 11.74 (N = 87) 11.57
8 - 11.71 (N = 87) - 11.85** 20 5.61 (N = 84) 5.68
9 - 9.42 (N = 83) - 9.70** 21 7.50 (N = 77) 7.54
10 - 13.11 (N = 77) - 13.24 22 4.31 (N = 66) 4.22
11 - 12.28 (N = 63) - 12.34 23 4.25 (N = 47) 4.41
12 - 8.37 (N = 45) - 8.38 24 8.02 (N = 19) 8.03
Entries are expected values (€) of choices made; averages over participants in the subgroup
*, **, ***at the entries for non-violators indicate that these values differ from those for violators, at the 10,
5, and 1% significance level, Mann–Whitney tests. Number of observations in parentheses (constant for
non-violators)
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an additional loss of expected payoffs for the set of choices made. This is caused by
the fact that lotteries in this subset had positive expected payoffs, and thus a
participant’s average expected payoff over choices made is harmed by simply
reducing the number of prominent-loss choices that are completed. This effect leads
to the negative effect on expected value for choices actually made under time
pressure, shown in row three of Table 3.
Figure 2 further illustrates different time-use strategies employed by violators
and non-violators by plotting the average decision time they spend on each item.
The strategy violators employed resembles the notion of ‘‘maximizer’’, first
discussed by Simon (1955, 1956) and formalized by Schwartz et al. (2002), in which
decision makers only settle for the best option. On the other hand, non-violators
seem to use a strategy in line with the notion of ‘‘satisficers,’’ who settle for an
option that seems good enough. In the absence of time pressure (upper panel),
violators clearly spend more time on each item than non-violators, and use a
substantial amount of time for some items that might be perceived as more difficult
by them, leading to higher variance in terms of the average time-used per item. In
the Web Appendix (Section B3) we provide additional analyses. Using panel
regressions to explain the time used on each item in the absence of a time constraint,
we find that violators on average use 6 s more on each item and that they are much
more sensitive to the difficulty of the expected value calculation than non-violators.
These results further support the notion that violators seem to behave as
‘‘maximizers’’. Under time pressure (lower panel in Fig. 2), violators initially use
much time and then almost monotonically reduce their time used per item as they
progress through the task.16 Compared to the non-violators who remain relatively
stable in their time use per item as they proceed through the task, violators thus
initially use more time, and later have even less time than the (on average) non-
violators take for the last few items. That is, given the significant punishment for
violation of the time constraint, violators exhibit poor time management.
An important question regarding the external validity of experimental observa-
tions of choice behavior concerns the correlation between time-constrained and
unconstrained behavior at the individual level. We observe that behavior and
outcomes are positively correlated across environments. Yet, correlations are larger
for non-violators than for violators.17 While non-violators seem to be able to
implement similar decision strategies both in the absence and in the presence of
time pressure, violators are less able to sustain the same strategy in the different
decision environments, especially for the last few items when they run out of time.
16 All items that a person cannot answer because time ran out are counted as zero time used. This is
consistent with the person having indeed used zero seconds to make the decision. Note that the non-zero
time use for later items in each subset by each group of violators is caused by the definition of violator
based on a violation in at least one of the two subsets. Thus, not all violators run out of time in the
prominent gain subset (prominent loss subset)
17 Results can be found in the Web Appendix, Table W11.
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To sum up, we document substantial selection effects under time pressure: those
participants who cannot cope with the time constraint have very different time-use
and decision strategies in the absence of time pressure. They make better decisions
when sufficient time is available (i.e., under no-time pressure conditions) than those
subjects who are not violating time-constraints under time pressure. However, under
time pressure they are not able to sustain these strategies anymore and therefore lose
out against the non-violators in terms of performance.
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5 Results: time pressure resistance—predicting who can better cope
with time pressure
5.1 The effect of observable traits: non-parametric analyses
Having observed that there are systematic differences in behavior between those
who can and those who cannot cope with time pressure well, we now investigate
whether there are observable traits or characteristics that allow predicting time
pressure resistance in risky decision making. We observe significant lower
intellectual efficiency and self-efficacy among violators (IE: 22.47 vs. 23.27 for
non-violators, SE: 28.36 vs. 29.80 for non-violators, Mann–Whitney tests, both
p\ 0.05). While not significant on conventional levels, there exist suggestive
differences in gender (29.31% male vs. 40.46% male for non-violators, Mann–
Whitney test, p = 0.14).18 For none of the Big Five items were there any differences
between violators and non-violators. Moreover, in the previous section we have
already shown the pronounced differences in time use strategies between violators
and non-violators. In the following we therefore study the differences between low
and high IQ, low and high IE, low and high self-efficacy, and small and large
amounts of time used/variance of time used (in the absence of time pressure).
Importantly, these differences are observed for all subjects, irrespective of whether
they violate the deadline under time pressure or not. That is, we can also make use
of variation in performance within the groups of violators and non-violators. Below
we will use these measures also jointly in a multivariate analysis as predictors of
decision performance under time pressure.
5.1.1 Cognitive ability and intellectual efficiency
We consider the role of IQ and IE on risky behavior, in time-constrained and
unconstrained settings. Despite being positively correlated (0.5760, p\ 0.01,
Spearman rank correlation),19 the correlation between IQ and IE is far from perfect,
suggesting that the two measures capture separate traits. Since we are interested in
outcomes and in selection effects, we report effects on the implied expected value
from the choices made and from all choice problems, the percentage of time-
constraint violators, the number of missing items per subject, and the incidence of
avoiding prominent losses and seeking prominent gains. Columns 1–4 of Table 5
report the results for IQ and IE.
To allow for direct group comparisons, we split the sample at the median values
of IQ and IE.20 As shown in the table, in the absence of time pressure, low IQ and
18 We analyze gender effects in Web Appendix B.1.
19 A related measure of intellectual efficiency was introduced by Gough (1957), as part of the California
Psychological Inventory. Similar to our findings, their measure of IE also correlated with several measures of
cognitive ability: It correlated 0.58 with scores on the Terman Concept Mastery Intelligence Test, 0.50 with
scores on the Kuhlman-Anderson Intelligence Test, 0.44 with scores on the Miller Analogies Test.
20 The median IQ is 10. We split the sample such that IQ\ 10 defines the ‘‘low’’ group. The median for
IE is 23. We split the sample such that IE\ 23 defines ‘‘low’’ group. In Web Appendix B.4 we consider
continuous measures as robustness checks replicating the results qualitatively.
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low IE subjects perform worse in terms of expected payoffs, and they are affected
more strongly by salient features of the lottery than high IQ and IE groups. These
results are consistent with previous findings in the literature (e.g., Dohmen et al.
2010). The table also suggests that the amount of time used by high IQ/IE subjects
and relatively low IQ/IE subjects is similar, in both conditions.21 Interestingly, the
table shows show that IQ is correlated with decision quality under time pressure,
while IE is not. The fact that IQ effects remain significant under time pressure
suggests that the absence of an effect for IE is not simply due to a larger noise under
time pressure. Note that we consider univariate correlations, and IE and IQ may be
differently affected by other variables that are related with behavior under time
pressure (e.g., gender), which will be controlled for in the multivariate analyses
below.
5.1.2 Self-efficacy
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5 show results for self-efficacy. Although self-efficacy
directly measures individuals’ ability to cope with hassles, similar to IE, there is no
raw correlation with behavior and performance under time pressure and without
time pressure.
5.1.3 Time-use strategies
As seen before, time-use strategies differ strongly across subjects and correlate with
violator status. Measuring the total time use and the variance across choice items in
the conditions with no time pressure for all subjects, we confirm the importance of
the measures. Table 6 shows strong effects on violator status and missing items:
those who make more careful decisions (higher time use and variance) are more
likely to violate the time constraint and miss out on answering items.22 However,
these careful decision makers do not perform worse on average than the less careful
ones. If they manage to meet the time constraint, they realize a higher performance.
Moreover, more careful decision makers are less prone to salience effects and obtain
higher expected payoffs on the choices they make.
5.2 Fitting a cumulative prospect theory decision model
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that observable characteristics are strongly associated
with risky behavior in the presence and absence of time pressure. A natural question
is whether we can link observable traits to a person’s ability to maintain her decision
processes under a tight time constraint. To answer this question, we make use of the
within-subject design to estimate a simplified cumulative prospect theory model
(CPT, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) for each participant on the basis of her 24
time-unconstrained choices, assuming that these unconstrained reflect her
21 This finding might derive from high-ability participants more carefully considering the decision, and
low-ability participants taking more time to understand the problem.
22 Similar to the previous analysis, we provide continuous measures in Web Appendix section B.4.
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preferences. We then assess how successfully these preferences are implemented
under time pressure. Predictive success is then related to observable characteristics.
Detailed methods and results are in Web Appendix A. Here we concisely state
the main results. The fitted CPT model has good predictive power.23 The overall
average success rate of predicting choices made under time pressure using time-
unconstrained fitted parameters is above 65%, which is significantly better than a
random prediction (p\ 0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). We find strong links
between observables and predictive success. For decision makers with higher
measures of IE, higher measures of self-efficacy, and less time-use in the absence of
time pressure, the fitted model predicts behavior under time pressure more
successfully than for those with lower measures in the respective comparison
categories. For IQ and variance in decision times, we find insignificant results. Thus,
there is clear evidence that observables relate to a person’s time pressure resistance.
Importantly, in contrast to an evaluation based on expected payoffs, the current
approach presumes no normative measure of success apart from stability of
preferences between the two environments; each person is evaluated on the basis of
her own choice behavior in the absence of time pressure, possibly showing loss
aversion and/or probability weighting.
Table 6 Effects of variance of time used per item and total time used (in the absence of time pressure)
on outcomes under time pressure
Performance measure VARHigh
(N = 189)
VARLow
(N = 190)
TimeHigh
(N = 191)
TimeLow
(N = 188)
Actual time used (in s) 172.55 144.04*** 176.46 139.77***
Expected value (choices made; €) - 1.15 - 1.32*** - 1.15 - 1.32***
Expected value (all decision
problems; €)
- 1.53 - 1.42 - 1.57 - 1.37
Percent time-constraint violators
(%)
34.39 13.16*** 36.65 10.64***
Number of missing items per
person
1.06 0.33*** 1.19 0.19***
Percent of choices avoiding
prominent loss (%)
50.80 58.79** 49.57 60.12***
Percent of choices seeking
prominent gain (%)
49.73 65.78*** 48.74 66.97***
*, **, ***at the entries for VARLow and TimeLow indicate that these values differ from those for VARHigh
and TimeHigh, at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, two-sided Mann–Whitney tests. The median
variance of time used per item under no time constraint is 12.74. We split the sample such that
VAR\ 12.74 is the low variance group; and time\ 201 s is the low time (faster) group. Total time was
200 s (in time pressure conditions)
23 It turns out that violators are significantly more loss averse (p\ 0.001) and have a lower probability
weighting parameter (p\ 0.06). This suggests another pathway through which violators may differ
systematically from non-violators.
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5.3 Multivariate analyses
We next provide multivariate analyses for our main dependent variables of interest.
We study the partial correlations of IE, IQ, self-efficacy, gender, as well as our two
time-use measures with the expected payoffs for the choices made (columns 1 and 2
in Table 7) and with the expected value over all choices (columns 3 and 4 in
Table 7), under time pressure. That is, we aim to identify whether using a set of
observables allows us to predict outcomes under time pressure. In addition, we also
conduct multivariate analyses for predictive success of the fitted CPT model under
time pressure, both for choices made (column 5 in Table 7) and for all decision
problems (column 6 in Table 7).
The results confirm our earlier findings but show overall modest explanatory
power of background variables for variations in expected payoff and predictive
power of individual decision models under time pressure. IQ and IE, which are
positively correlated, are significant predictors of expected value and predictive
success. As expected, IE seems more relevant for all choices (including missed
items), while IQ is more relevant for choices made. F-tests suggest that IE and IQ
jointly determine the decision quality, with higher ability participants making better
choices (EV) and more consistent choice across time pressure settings. Total time
used in the absence of time pressure predicts better decisions over choices made, but
lower predictive success over all choices. We find no significant effect of gender.
Self-Efficacy has a significant effect only for predictive success over all choices
made.
Overall, we can explain only a small amount of the variance in expected value
and in predictive success of the fitted CPT model. Although IE, IQ and time used
strategy under unconstrained conditions are helpful in predicting decisions, our
results still emphasize the necessity of finding better instruments to predict the
ability to perform under time pressure.
6 Discussion
We set out to study the role of selection in time-pressured decision environments,
and how it is linked to observable characteristics of the decision maker, including
those characteristics that can be made observable using survey and experimental
techniques. Clearly, different decision styles play an important role. Those who can
and those who cannot easily cope with the time constraint in risky decisions differ
along various dimensions. People who violate time constraints, i.e. those with lower
time pressure resistance, make more careful (more variance, more time used), and
consequently more successful decisions (higher EV, less affected by salient
outcomes) when unconstrained. They also initially perform better under time
pressure. However, as they run out of time, they cannot implement their strategy
anymore, leading to considerable losses. Consequently, their performance and
behavior are also much less correlated between the time pressure and the no-
pressure conditions than it is the case for non-violators. A fitted decision model on
the basis of behavior in the absence of time pressure, is less predictive of their
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decisions under time pressure than is the case for non-violators. Violators try to
make good decisions, sacrificing time, and violating the time constraint despite
severe punishment (payment of maximum loss in the current design): they have
poor time management. Because violators and non-violators differ on a range of
characteristics, causal effects observed in non-violators may not be representative
for the population as a whole.
The results have implications in practical contexts. Different people fit into
different environments in terms of decision style. Making good decisions in one
setting does not necessarily predict good decision-making in another setting. For
instance, maximizers who perform well given the time to thoroughly seek and
compare alternatives might not fit well in rapid decision making environments.
More problematic from a practical perspective is the fact that our results suggest a
trade-off between good decision-making in adverse versus good decision-making in
a less constrained decision context. For a position with varying environmental
conditions, it might thus be difficult to find a good candidate.
In terms of predicting who performs well under time pressure, it is important to
identify different types of individuals in terms of time pressure resistance. Our
experiment aimed at making the differences in decision style under time pressure
observable by considering measures of ability, personality and decision process/
strategy. We find that various measures correlate with outcomes under time pressure
and with the proneness to being attracted by salient features of prospects. Including
these variables in a multivariate analysis, we identify IQ, IE and time-use in the
absence of time pressure as moderate predictors of success under time pressure.
Corroborating previous results by Kuhnen and Melzer (2014), self-efficacy is the
only personality trait that has a weak systematic influence on decision-making.
Overall, the predictive power of observables is low, suggesting that we miss out
important unobservable aspects of the decision strategies. As employers often use
similar batteries of personality and intelligence tests in making employment
selection, this finding seems to be particularly important in practice. Identifying
people based on tests for cognitive abilities and standard personality questionnaires
may prove to be insufficient when selecting agents who need to perform in adverse
decision environments, such as under time pressure. More complex, experimental-
based assessments of decision strategies under job-specific adverse conditions seem
warranted.
We also obtain results regarding the determinants of risky decision strategies.
The finding that cognitive ability relates to higher realized expected payoffs is
consistent with the extant literature. In a representative sample of the German
population, Dohmen et al. (2010) find that subjects with higher cognitive skills are
willing to take more risks. Similarly, Benjamin et al. (2013) report for Chilean high
school students a significant correlation of risk aversion and cognitive capacities.
With the average participant being risk averse, these directional effects are
consistent with higher expected payoffs in our setting. However, other researchers
have questioned the evidence on cognitive ability and risk taking. Andersson et al.
(2016) provide evidence that these correlations may be spurious. They assert that, in
fact, cognitive capacities are related to making errors and that the specific design of
choice lists triggers the interpretation of differential risk attitudes. Our design does
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not involve choice lists, suggesting the cognitive ability effects are not merely
driven by these design issues. However, our results suggest that the link between
cognitive ability and risk behavior may be more moderate compared to the effects
reported by Dohmen et al. (2010).
In conclusion, we find that selection is an important factor in adverse decision
environments. The relevance of selection effects has implications for the
interpretation of the average laboratory behavior in terms of population parameters,
and for the interpretation in terms of external validity of realistic decision-making
scenarios (Ganster 2005). We identify predictors of time pressure resistance that aid
the assessment of external validity of lab measurements. However, more work is
needed to make aspects of decision style and the use of heuristics predictable. If
behavioral measures are shown to be of limited explanatory power, neurological
markers may provide an interesting alternative (e.g., Buckert et al. 2014;
Kandasamy et al. 2014). Identifying people’s ability to cope with time pressure is
not a straightforward task. Tests for cognitive ability or intellectual efficiency and
standard questionnaires need to be accompanied by additional measures.
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Appendix
Risky behavior under time pressure: summary of results
See Table 8.
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List of binary risky choices
See Table 9.
Table 8 Related literature on the effect of time pressure on decisions under risk
Effect of time pressure Potential
selection
problems?
Weak time
pressure?
Ben-Zur and
Breznitz (1981)
Risk aversion : No Yes
Busemeyer
(1985)
Risk aversion ; for losses, risk aversion : for gains No No
Dror et al. (1999) Risk aversion : or ; (dep. on level of risk) No Yes
Maule et al.
(2000)
Risk aversion ; for losses, no effect for gains No Yes
Huber and Kunz
(2007)
Risk aversion ; No Yes
Chandler and
Pronin (2012)
Risk aversion ; No Yes
Young et al.
(2012)
Probability weighting : (for gains), no effect for
losses
Yes No
Kocher et al.
(2013)
Loss aversion :, no effect for gains, for mixed
gambles: more loss averse and gain seeking.
Yes No
Nursimulu and
Bossaerts
(2013)
Risk aversion ; Yes Yes
Madan et al.
(2015)
Risk aversion ; (for gains) Yes No
Saqib and Chan
(2015)
Risk preferences reverse: risk seeking for gains and
risk aversion for losses.
Unclear No
Hu et al. (2015) Risk aversion ; Unclear Unclear
Haji et al. (2016) Risk aversion : Yes No
Kirchler et al.
(2017)
Risk aversion : for gains, Risk aversion ; for losses Yes No
Gawryluk and
Krawczyk
(2017)
Risk aversion : No Unclear
Column 3 indicates whether due to violation of the time constraint, internal validity might not hold, as the
sample of violators is potentially self-selected. Column 4 indicates that there was no imposition of
substantial time pressure which led to negative payout consequences (for example a time limit that could
not be exceeded or a time limit under which hardly anyone misses the time limit)
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Graphical presentation of risky choices
Incentivization of cognitive ability tasks
The IQ and IE tasks were incentivized in the following way. In each task we count
the number of correct items. This number then determines the probability to win a
fixed prize of €10 in the IQ and of €20 in the IE task. The probability is calculated as
P(win €10) = (Number of correct items ? 1)/(12 ? 1) in the IQ task; and as P(win
€20) = (Number of correct items ? 1)/(34 ? 1) in the IE task. That is, subjects
have a clear incentive to solve as many items as possible, since their expected
payoff is monotonically increasing in the number of correct items. At the same time,
they always have a positive probability of winning the prize.
The procedure was chosen to make sure that participants could never draw clear
conclusions regarding their score or regarding the correct answer of single items.
We wanted to avoid such inference because we did not want subjects to draw strong
inference regarding their cognitive ability from our experiment. Note that subjects
learned about the outcome of the random payment draw only at the end of the
experiment if either Part 1 or Part 4 were randomly selected for real payment.
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